During the LISS-COST State of Surveillance conference in Barcelona (May 2012), I was asked to give a short talk at one of the evening public events associated with the conference.
I spoke about the politics of resistance to surveillance, and I've just found the scribbled handwritten notes from the talk, so I'll transcribe them here, combined with what I think I was trying to argue. The photo was taken by Kevin Macnish. This was also the first time I'd been simultaneously translated.
"I'd like to talk about the politics of resistance to surveillance. I'll mainly draw upon examples from the UK, the country with potentiall the most CCTV per head, which has seen a government or two with enthusiasm for surveillance, a proposed ID card, and where surveillance has come to public attention. Surveillance had become a public political issue to the extent that it featured in opposition manifestos during the last general election, and cropped up in the coalition agreement. However, the UK's seen variable resistance to surveillance. There is sometimes opposition, public outcry, surveillance programmes sometimes get cancelled. But at other times there's nothing, no interest. Sometimes there is even public enthusiasm, even if some of that is fairly manufactured.
So there are two things - variable resistance to surveillance, and variable effects of that resistance. First a word about what I mean be resistance. Political resistance, for me, attempts to change, alter, regulate or remove surveillance. It is not an attempt to live with surveillance, or to evade it personally.
So in this reading, using TOR to disguise your own internet traffic, or wearing a bandana at a protest in order to hide your face, then I don't really want to call this political resistance.
My main argument is that, apart from specific privacy activists, resistance is not often thought of as 'resisting surveillance' as we might think of it analytically within surveillance studies. Rather, it's more often part of a wider politics. This can be a liberal politics, for example a human rights discourse, but (at least in the UK) significant resistance to surveillance is driven by other things, including economics, identity and personal situations.
Some implications, or if you were in an Leninist/Bolshevik mood, and wanted to promote resistance to surveillance, then I think you'd need to make links with existing political struggles, and look for the presence of surveillance in other politics. There are a couple of problems with this. We can see that often the perceptions of what particular surveillance technologies are 'for' more important than the actual function of those technologies. Additionally, it also suggests that the activity of academic or
journalistic 'revelation' in which a previously hidden surveillance
practice is identified as such, doesn't often produce resistance (in itself). It's
not surveillance targeted at the audience, its not effecting them. Experience of
surveillance is probably a critical matter in resistance.
Secondly, surveillance effects are not evenly distributed, and even if we do live in a surveillance society then this tends to impact us along existing social striations. Unfortunately, this tends to mean that those impacted often lack the social capital and resources to effectively challenge surveillance practices (in a political sense). Sometimes resistance to surveillance emerges when that surveillance threatens to remove or challenge a social privilege (see the article in Surveillance and society on speed camera). This might be a problem for certain types of radical politics.
This whole picture might prompt a politics of coalition, where you would attempt to make the connections between different politics issues each (or all) having a surveillant dimension."
Research into Surveillance and Identity issues, by Dr David Barnard-Wills.
Thursday, 6 September 2012
Tuesday, 14 August 2012
CFP: Governing digital expression in the information age
Journal of Information Technology and Politics
Call for Papers ‘Governing digital expression in the information age:
Free‐speech, surveillance and censorship’
Guest editors: Helena Carrapico (University of Coimbra/ University of Strathclyde) and Benjamin Farrand (University of Strathclyde)
What connects pro‐democracy and protest movements in the Arab world, Europe, and the Americas is not only their democratic aspirations, but also their innovative forms of communication and organization through online means, which are sometimes considered to be outside of the State’ control. At the same time, however, it has become apparent that countries are attempting to increase their understanding of, and control over, their citizens’actions in the digital sphere. This involves development of surveillance instruments, control mechanisms, and processes engineered to dominate the digital public sphere, and necessitates the assistance and support of private actors. Examples include the growing use of Internet surveillance technology with which online data traffic is analyzed and the extensive monitoring of social networks. Despite increased media attention, academic debate on these technologies, mechanisms, and techniques remains relatively limited, as is discussion of the involvement of corporate actors.
The guest editors of this special issue welcome articles reflecting on how Internet‐ related technologies, mechanisms, and techniques may be used as a means to enable expression, but also to restrict speech, manipulate public debate, and 'manage' global populaces. Articles should be no more than 8,000 words, including references, and should be sent to the guest editors Helena Carrapico (helena.carrapico@eui.eu) and Benjamin Farrand (benjamin.farrand@strath.ac.uk), and officially submitted through the journal’s manuscript submission system (http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/witp).
All manuscripts should follow APA, 6th Edition formatting guidelines.
The deadline for submission is October 31, 2012. Please contact the guest editors with any questions regarding the special issue.
Saturday, 4 August 2012
Representing Surveillance, Privacy and Identity Technology
Towards the tail end of the VOME project, working at Cranfield, I was trying to get some input for artistic projects by David Benque and Austin Houldsworth on representing surveillance, privacy and identity technology,. As part of this, I asked around for comment and suggestions. I had the following responses which I've collated together. I'd been meaning to post this for a while.
Many thanks to John Guelke, Christian Bonnici, Aaron Martin, Bernd Stahl, Chiara Fonio, Athina Karatzogianni, James Harding, Jason Pridmore, Dan Trottier, Kevin Haggerty, Stuart Reeves, Kristen Veel, Kirstie Ball and Gavin Smith for their help with this. They each answered the following questions:
1) If there was one concept or idea regarding the topics of privacy, surveillance, and identity technology that you wished was better understood by the general public, what would it be? Why is this idea important?
2) Are there topics or issues in this area that you feel are particularly difficult to grasp?
There was a range of responses, and I think they make interesting reading.
You can download the pdf from here
Many thanks to John Guelke, Christian Bonnici, Aaron Martin, Bernd Stahl, Chiara Fonio, Athina Karatzogianni, James Harding, Jason Pridmore, Dan Trottier, Kevin Haggerty, Stuart Reeves, Kristen Veel, Kirstie Ball and Gavin Smith for their help with this. They each answered the following questions:
1) If there was one concept or idea regarding the topics of privacy, surveillance, and identity technology that you wished was better understood by the general public, what would it be? Why is this idea important?
2) Are there topics or issues in this area that you feel are particularly difficult to grasp?
There was a range of responses, and I think they make interesting reading.
You can download the pdf from here
Monday, 18 June 2012
building you own data node
Just read this on Brock Craft's blog, about building your own data sharing sensors:
One of the purposes of the VOME project was to try to find ways to help people reflect upon their position and experience within such an environment. I wonder what we might have been able to do if we'd done something like this (instead of or as well as the other fun stuff we did!). Take that quote as a starting hypothesis, combine some tech education, with some qualitative ethnographic stuff, and a bit of co-design. Something to file for the future I think.Building your own data node raises an awareness of the data all around us, and gives one pause to consider our place within the global information space.
Wednesday, 13 June 2012
State of Surveillance - Living In Surveillance Societies conference, Barcelona
State of
Surveillance. LISS-COST conference 3 – Barcelona.
28th May to 1st June 2012
I was in Barcelona this week for the third ‘living in
surveillance societies’ conference, and as is becoming fairly routine, I’ll
blog some of my notes from the conference. There are a few summative thoughts at the end
of this.
William Webster
(Uni. Sterling) opened the conference with
a talk about surveillance studies as an ‘x-ray’into the state,
potentially offering a different perspective on government, public admin, and
the nature of ICTs. This drew upon Jack Taylor’s theory of informatisation as
an x-ray. In order to understand the state, we have to understand its
information flows, how these interaction technology and existing practices. We
can’t understand the state w/out understanding information and IT, and this
will give us a deeper understanding of government. Information is seen as critical resources, rapidly taken up by the
state, and made central. Institutional arrangements are shaped by and shape
informatising powers. William proposed
surveillance as a concept for
interpreting the state, as a factor of production, as a normal part of life,
but an increasing part, as an understanding that all ICT’s have a latent
surveillance potential (I like this framing), and that surveillance shines
light on why information is collected, how, for what purposes, and what are the
informational relationships between the surveilled and the surveyor. For
Webster, states are always concereend with surveillance, the capture of
information for the provision of services and protection is part of the core
purpose of the state (e.g. tax). The state is information intensive and
collects and processes vast quantities of information. Surveillance platforms
emerge from state investment in the technology. The state normalises
surveillance, it habituates us to the exchange of information for services,
which is then used elsewhere. There is also explicit surveillance for
protection of the state, which then enters the domestic sphere. The state also
plays a key role in regulating surveillance in terms of rights and protections.
William addressed a few potential concerns with this
perspective, including the misrepresentation of a dystopian picture of the
state, the strong normative base of the field, top down views of relations
between state and citizens, that eGovt is not surveillance, that the theory is
the same as informatisation, and that there is nothing new about the
surveillance perspective.I was concerned about making a distinction between the
argument that we need to understand information or surveillance in order to
understand the state form, from the argument that we automatically have a
privileged perspective by using surveillance. I think there’s certainly
something to this focus upon the information and surveillance practices, and
how they make up the state. Although the question and answer session after the
paper suggested that there were a lot of different perspectives across the
different disciplines in surveillance studies. I’d quite like to go over this
paper from a political philosophy perspective. I have a sneaking suspicion that
some of the strong sociological threads in surveillance studies might be
leading to some reification of the state, which might well be understudied
given the sympathy for the subjects of surveillance.
Michael Nagenborg
spoke about Anonymous, collective identities and hacker practices – something
I’d looked at a little in my own paper ‘This is not a Cyber-war....’. Michel drew quite strongly upon the work of
Gabriella Coleman on Anonymous, which he strongly recommended reading. He was
not offering a defence of anonymous, but argued that they are not ‘others’,
outsiders of western liberal traditions, but rather make relatively familiar
claims to freedom of the individual, free speech and against censorship.
However, one divergence from this ethical tradition is the rejection of
visibility of an identifiable person behind political statements and ethical
acts. He drew upon the Hacker Ethic (1984) and its moral core. He argued that
this set of ethics is still recognised in places, including, as an example Mark
Zuckerberg’s claims that information wants to be free. There are tensions now
between the ethic of early hacking and the digital mainstream of today – the
powerful centralising effect of facebook for example. The hacker ethic included
a strong egalitarian position in which hackers would be judged on their hacking
rather than on irrelevant personal identity characteristics. Michel also
pointed to circular media reactions to hacking (often starting with a young
male caught for computer crime) and how early hackers became a threat to
national security almost by accident. This includes outright misrepresentation,
such as news reports that suggested people would be unable to use their credit
cards due to anonymous, when only the public facing website of MasterCard was
affected by DDoS attacks, and was presumably unconnected to the payments
systems. He drew attention to the meme that using the internet anonymously is
morally irresponsible – this allowed him to move to his second theme – the
ethics of the mask.
The mask allows the wearer to be present in space, but
harder to identify. It also prevents reading of the face. It shifts power to
the wearer of the mask, but does not silence the wearer. It prevents
non-presence. The pseudonym is similar, allowing comment or action without
identification. In hacker culture bragging is an important feature, and there
is a need to attribute hacks with their authors. Michael engaged with Agamben’s
work on persona to look at the space between the actor and the act that the
mask allows and how this might itself be an ethical space allowing possible
reflection. He connected this to ‘Being Anonymous’ where some people using the
Guy Fawkes wake up to a larger identity and awareness through this practice. Michael
seemed to be seeing this as an individual process, but on further reflection,
it sounds a little like some of the group consciousnesses that can emerge from
participation in collective action. Michael did identify the totalitarian
potential within anonymous masked collectives- which would also resonate with
some of those powerful group subordinated identities. Trust dynamics seemed to
be important, but also incredibly problematic given anonymity. This suggests to
me that there might be some value in a language for practices of trust in
situations of anonymity. I’m guessing that this might potentially emerge from
within collectives like anonymous, rather than be written for it by somebody
outside, but it’s certainly something to look for.
Ben Wagner, from
the European University Institute spoke about internet censorship and
surveillance before, after and during the jasmine revolution in Tunisia. He
started with Ben Ali’s final speech, which was full of concessions, but
included the opening up of the internet, with no censorship and no
surveillance. Whilst these concessions were ineffective (Ben Ali fled the
country within 12 hours of making the speech) Ben thought it was important to
ask why he had felt it necessary to include these particular concessions. Ben
spoke about how the infrastructure of Tunisian internet surveillance simply
stopped, was turned off within two hours – as evidenced by the explosion in
Tunisian access to YouTube. This ability to turn things off hints at a strong
degree of centralisation. Ben also spoke about the role of Tunisian telecoms
providers which attempted, post-revolution, to position themselves not as
censors and surveillers, but just as service providers. Ben’s historical account of developing
surveillance and censorship through the late 1990’s to 2011 was an interesting
picture of privatisation, increasing bandwith, and shopping expeditions for
surveillance technology. The Tunisian regime apparently bought similar,
overlapping pieces of surveillance technology from several different providers
so as to prevent being locked-in to any particular vendor. This was combined
with a typical authoritarian move of slipllting up surveillance and censorship
roles across different agencies, although the boundaries blurred under pressure.
Ben remarked on the local inability to develop these systems, leaving countries
like Tunisia dependent on international markets. Centralisation of architecture
and institutions makes the regime possible, functional differention
protections, stabilises and allows the regime to adapt. International markets
crucial for access to technology, consultants and systems.
Concluding the first panel session was Pete Fussy, talking about the centrifugal and centripetal
governance of UK counter-terrorist surveillance. Counter-terrorist practice is
conflicted and fragmented and not as coherent as we might think. This brings
its own problems of accountability. The state acts as both the ‘risk-holder’
and a target of terrorism, but responsibility is dispersed (for example to the
private sector or local government). There is surveillance in different forms
throughout the CONTEST strategy, and this is often in tension with other parts
of the strategy. He drew upon a number of terrorism events that have been
particularly influential on UK counter-terrorism strategy (notably the
Herhausen assassination by red army faction in Germany and the bombings in
London by David Copeland). These events produced narratives about what is
learned from these events. This now leads to a focus on upstream preventing,
hostile reconnaissance, owning suspiscion and the normality of space (including
attention towards ‘matter out of place’). Drawing upon policing literature,
Pete suggested that when discretion increases in policing, more stereotypes are
used, and there is a greater play upon ‘respectable fears’. He used the case
study of Operation Champion (the placing of CCTV cameras for counter-terrorist
purposes around ethnic minority communities in Birmingham as an example of the
levels of government involved. This project was cancelled due to public
backlash.
In the second session Peter
Lauritsen spoke about research into video surveillance in Danish police
work. This highlighted the challenges of establishing video surveillance,
police hesitating in adopting and using the new technology despite legal
reforms and political pressure for them to use it. The solution (CCTV) was
politically determined prior to the specific problem it was to be used to
solve. Police were not convinced that CCTV would make their work more
effective, and rarely used it in solving crimes. Lauritson described these
issues as ‘oligoptic bugs’ and highlighted the fragility of surveillance
systems. Opinion on the usefulness of surveillance tech is ‘yes’ but not for
serious crime or safety. Help in understanding the sequence of events and
dealing with regular normal events (e.g crowd flows at football). Tom de Schepper and Paul de Hert spoke about use of CCTV in
Flemish cities and municipalities, arguing that efficiency objections (cctv
doesn’t do much) will have to be looked at again (possibly constantly) as the
technology improves and developes. There is a need to know details about this,
but also to open discussion on comparative numbers and legal cultures. This was
a fairly quantitative paper, which attempt to draw some large scale models for
the likelihood of cctv use across different jurisdictions. Tanguy le Goff spoke about his ethnographic research on municipal
CCTV workers in France. This work fits into a tradition of cctv control centre
ethnographies which is getting pretty developed now. Tanguy focused upon the
relative social invisibility of the workers in the control centre compared to
their cameras, and also to the subjects of surveillance.
Kevin Macnish gave
a philosophical paper on authority and surveillance. This was based around a
definition of authority, with strong links to context, persons in roles,
appropriate delegation or attribution of authority. I liked the way that Kevin
broke up the potential sources of authority into
top-down/peer/bottom-up(democratic).I had a couple of thoughts about this
approach. Firstly, I think the routinisation of surveillance makes some changes
to the actual perceptions of necessity and authority. Secondly, this approach
of holding ‘all other things’ consistent in order to focus upon authority is
probably analytically necessary, and does introduce some clarity into the
political theory of surveillance. It sits uncomfortably for a lot of people,
because firstly there’s a sense that ‘all other things are not equal’ and that
surveillance actors are often not legitimate, necessary or other qualifiers.
Secondly, because there’s a sense that a scheme like this might legitimate
surveillance. It will, because it is intended to, and exists in a world in
which there is some legitimate surveillance, carried out by legitimate actors.
What this does is opens up the whole set of institutions in contemporary
society for challenges about the sources of their authority to act, and how
accountable this is – it is not just surveillant institutions that might be
lacking in just authority. ‘Authority’ in practice just doesn’t play out in
analytically neat ways, but in complex, negotiated, challenged, contested power
and politics.
The second day of the conference kicked off with an early
panel on ‘Scandinavian Exceptionalism and surveillance studies’ which I saw
part of. I think this revolved around
the extent to which several Scandinavian countries could be thought of together
in relation to their experiences and attitudes towards surveillance (contrasted
perhaps to ‘anglo-saxon’ or ‘continential’ models and traditions). Looking at
the discussion, the answer could well have been... maybe, sort-of, but in a
very careful and contingent way, that recognises the significant differences
even within that grouping.
The next panel session had a presentation from Massimo Ragnedda on student attitudes
towards Facebook in Italy. He was drawing upon a similar model of research by
PVNETs and also Christian Fuchs to assess student knowledge about surveillance
in society, their practices and concerns about personal data. He found that
students were much more worried about personal surveillance by their peers than
by institutions or for marketing purposes. Massimo described this as ‘strong
against the weak, and weak with the strong’, and identified what he saw as a
underestimation of the use of data and targeted advertising. Jason Pridmore spoke about sign-on
surveillance and transitions in consumer surveillance. This included the shifts
from knowing customers and relationship marketing with web based information
platforms for companies, to social networking. Social sign-on includes the
log-in with facebook, and includes the reliance on 3rd parties to
say who you are. This is a delegation (Jason’s drawing upon Actor Network
Theory to make sense of this). Marketers have delegated data acquisition to
social networks, while social sign-on creates active participation, towards the
dream of a targeted market. This creates a particular personalised world at the
intersection of social media and big data. Bence
Sagvari gave a presentation on children’s online safety. He linked this to
an ideology combining a desire for a risk-free environment, a notion of
childhood innocence, and moral blindness. A culture of fear drives
disproportionate reactions, combining the fear of the new, exaggerated media
panics, and reverse socialisation. Monitoring software is constructed as the
thing for responsible people to use, the use is binary or not with reduced room
for negotiation, communication and development over time. He related this to
trust, suggested that trusting leads to trustworthiness over time. He looked at
other alternative strategies in use for managing safety online including
co-use, active mediation, restrictive mediation, moniroting, technical
restrictions. Across the EU, there was relatively low use of monitoring but it
was most widespread in the UK, Poland and Ireland. Bence identified a shift
from a paradigm of self regulation and strict state/governmental control
towards a more flexible and faster co-regulatory regime.
After lunch, Evgenia
Alexandropoulou and Maria Nikita
spoke about the Greek regulatory framework for personal data protection, with
specific attention to the way that this affected the placement of CCTV within
various different locations in Greek society.
All the general European data processing requirements (consent of data
subjects, appropriate security measures, notifying the DPA) all apply to video
surveillance, except when used for security reasons. The framework seems much
stronger than in place in the UK, with some quite sensible distinctions between
different types of place, but I was unable to find out how they got to this
situation, what the politics of it were.
One particularly strong element was that the Greek constitution
prohibits the use of ‘evidence’ collected by systems not in compliance with
data protection (unless this is the only way you might prove your innocence of
a crime). Eleni Crysopoulou spoke
about surveillance and the investigation of organised crime, Lilian Mitrou presented on naming and
shaming in Greece as a form of social control. Public stigmatisation raises
feelings of guilt and shame, and shaming practices imposed psychological and
social costs. She gave a short history of branding and similar practices of
‘spoiled identities’ as a mechanism of preserving social order. The growth of a
strong central state and increased mobility shifts this model, but she believes
we now see a rebirth of shaming, including as a tool of law enforcement. Anti
sex-offender legislation in 2007 was based around the concept of a right to
informed living – the right to exercise informed choice about those you
associate with. The previous criminal behaviour of a person was not counted as
part of personal information, and doesn’t benefit from the protection
associated with it. Now the naming of tax evaders, as a comeback of the scarlet
letter as part of an acknowledgement of the supposed limits of traditional
methods. Mitrou described this as ‘social control by the man next door’ and
identified that there was no evidence of the usefulness or efficacy of shaming
in dealing with crime. I wanted to make a distinction between public
identification of criminals, and public shaming (including mainly the direction
of identification, the purposes of knowledge-release, and the forms that
takes).
The final session of the day introduced work by Andreas Pap on the practice and
political philosophy of regulation of public access to criminal data. This
involves asking how technologies constitutional requirements – for example of
access to the court room. Is there a legal difference between physical presence
and online access/broadcasts? What are the publicity expectations of testimony?
Arguments for courtroom transparency including controlling the judicial
process, courts as community norm upholders, presenting the law in action, providing
legitimacy for law and law enforcement, judicial offices being public places.
Arguments against include the invasion of privacy, identity theft, victims
being afraid to report crimes, cameras intimidating jurors, and secondary
victimisation. Andreas identified some different tensions in different
countries including frespeach vs free trial in the US, privacy in a transparent
democracy in Sweden, and democracy vs privacy in Hungary. In the US the general
rule is that reporters are no different to any single individual member of the
public. There are also business making money out of providing searches of court
records on people, with significant regularity. In Sweden, criminal data is not
available, but employers can ask individuals to get it on themselves and show
it. In Hungary, privacy is the heritage
of the dictatorship, but there are complications in that there are no official
hate crimes in Hungary, because the police ‘don’t know’ minority status (as a
protection). The transparency deficit is also a democratic deficit.
Heidi Mork Lomel
gave a really interesting presentation on the role and impact of faulty
statistics in surveillance policy debates. Drawing upon case studies from
Norway, she looked at the way that controversial surveillance initiatives are
legitimated with the help of persuasive but dubious statistics (that won’t go
away). Proposals for open street CCTV in 1993 looked to the UK, and claimed
30-60% crime reduction effects. These claims were not challenged, but rather
made it ‘almost impossible not to try [CCTV] in Oslo. After introduction, the
success criteria change from deterrence of crime to detection of crime. There
is a shift from number to belief and convction. The new numbers may not
document some achievement, but police officers and security agents believe it,
despite what ‘researchers’ might claim. Later sober and critical evaluations
from the UK of CCTV, didn’t have much effect on the debate. Similar effects for
the expansion of the DNA database (alongside looking towards the UK for initial
statistical evidence). Success criteria shifted from detection rates to the
number of registrants in the database, and how many hits when the database was
used. Interpreters do not say that researchers are ‘wrong’ but rather that they
still believe in the questioned practice.
The persuasive power of numbers is used to bolster weak arguments and
doubt statistics of opponents. But nothing happens when numbers are proved
wrong. Statistics that prove what you think. Further research requires a focus
upon the preliminary stages, what numbers, what sources, and how are they used.
How do politicians use research. The
numbers allow the making of decisions without seeming to decide, not ‘we want
this controversial thing’. These are ridiculous numbers that play a central
political role, especially when linked to concepts of proportionality. Some of
the reasons for this include a lack of mathematical competence, technology
optimism, lack of scepticism and critical reflection, and a state of emergency/necessary
evil. I really enjoyed this presentation because I’d never really thought about
numbers in relation to discourses of surveillance before, they’re an intimate
part of legitimating and representing surveillance practices.
I was at the parallel Doctoral School session first thing on
the morning of the third day of the conference, looking at the PhD work of
Maria Murphy and Philip Shultz, so I missed a panel of surveillance and
ethnography. When I rejoined the main
conference stream, Rosamunde Van Brakel
was presenting on using the concept of play to better understand some forms of
surveillance and our interaction with it. Separating her work from playful
representations of surveillance, she ran through a number of interesting
projects and made a strong argument that further work on the relation between
surveillance and play was necessary. Louise
Norgaard Glud and Sofie Stenbog
spoke about the work of Chinese artist and dissident Ai-Wei Wei who makes use
of surveillance as a device in his art but who has also been put under
surveillance by the Chinese authorities. This presentation touched on issues of
self-surveillance and empowerment, the multiple audiences for surveillance, and
the way that the camera (and presumably other surveillance technologies) can
act as as a sign of surveillance as much as a technology of it. Susanne Wigort Tngvesson, spoke about
perception, surveillance, logics of seeing, interpretation and various other
aspects of the theory of vision, particularly drawing upon the work of
Merleau-Ponty. Finally in this session, Kat Hadjimatheou spoke about the research the Detecter project at
Birmingham had done with counter-terrorist professionals and their perceptions
of the practical and ethical factors in their use of surveillance. This
included the perception of technology as a double edged sword, that both
enabled and could protect against invasions of privacy, reducing the
effectiveness of oversight and make legal regulation obsolete, both increase
and reduce trust in CT practitioners, and allow the maintenance of ‘back doors’
useful to police but at the same time the source of security breaches.
Technology was represented by one participant as ‘the only alternative to
repression’. Police officers felt prevented from doing ‘normal’ technological
things, for example using mobile phones to send MMS to each other. There was also concern for a ‘CSI effect’ in
which high public expectations of police technologies were not met, with the
concern that if things were not recorded, they were not happening. Security
practitioners worried about collateral damage in terms of the non-suspected
caught up in surveillance operations, but not too much about the false
positives. In terms of what they thought
about ethics per se, Kat reflected that ethics, primarily meant
proportionality, which meant The Law. In
the questions following, Pete Fussy drew parallels with the police studies
literature, and the sense of beleaguerment
running through cop culture.
After lunch, Jerome
Ferret spoke about policing in the risk society and panoptical violence.
This drew upon the sociology of the state, something he felt was
underrepresented in ango-american sociology but more present in the French
tradition. Two points Jerome highlighted were the different between terrorism
policing and risk policing, and the practice of symbolic distrust of the police
by politicians, which he interpreted as the state saying to its ‘troops’, ‘you
are not working well, I’ll turn to the private sector’. Franciso Klauser spoke about the surveillant management of space at
sporting mega-events, using the Euro 2008 football tournament as a case study.
Francisco drew upon Foucault’s work on security, territory and population to
talk about space as a mediator of power, not just in fixed isolated space such
as the panopticon, but also flows in open space. With the interrelation of
terrorism and mobility systems, the challenge is how to secure control without
breaking those mobility systems. There
is a temporally and spatially dynamic pathwork of access and passage control
points, monitoring, restricting and filtering, but also facilitating and
speeding up different forms of movements. I was also in this session, giving my
own talk on aerial photographic reconnaissance during the two world wars, and
what surveillance studies could draw from military history, which I’ll write
about separately.
Picking between two parallel sessions, I attended a talk by Ian Tucker, talking about visibility in
new media, and the constant engagement and informational interaction. Ian’s
approach is social psychological, with a conception of subjectivity as fluid,
transformed, produced through relational processes. Ian was interested in the
relationships between power and affect, and how affects combine. This might include the way that we use
technology and new media for our benefits, to enhance our capacities to act,
but these technologies may also limit other capacities over time. All new media
technology is affective – this engages with its ability to after ‘power to act’
but also retains the non-deterministic, notion of the human. Foucault’s ‘care
of the self’ suggests something strategic, but its really isn’t, there’s too
much information. Ian suggested we’re fundamentally still learning how to live
surveillantly. Darren Ellis took a dive into the literature on trust, both
emotional and psycho-social, in relation to citizens perception. In relation to
privacy and technology, he found a relatively unsophisticated understanding of
trust, linked to polls and surveys, and not accounting for trust dynamics.
Darren wanted to break down the opposition of trust and distrust on a single
continuum, and also challenge how certain levels of trust were interpreted as
distrust. Similarly, trust is often thought of as good, something we should do,
with distrust bad, a psychological disorder (and this certainly has a
politics). He drew upon Luhman to suggest that both trust and distrust were
potentially coexistant, and were both mechanisms for managing the complexity of
information, uncertainty and complexity. It could potentially be dangerous to
increase one without the other (vulnerability and paranoia). With impersonal
trust through the functioning of a system, this requires something of a leap of
faith and suspension of doubt, in which we accept assurances or look for
further safeguards. The question is how to do this in surveillance contexts?
Turning to Giddens, Darren looked at the way trust in abstracts systems is
achieved through ‘access points’ where facework and impression management
occurs, and the suspension of doubt is managed. Surveillance systems often have
very restricted access points, continue to remain faceless. This leaves a gap
in how to negotiate distrust. David
Harper gave a presentation on conspiracy and urban myths in relation to
surveillance, looking at rumour, contemporary legends and the public
understanding of the use of personal information. He drew upon the literature
on folklore and contemporary legends, showing several urban myths about
surveillance, but asked why there were not more conspiracy stories about
surveillance, and suggested that this was actually due to an absence of
information. He understood conspiracy
stories as a form of social epistemology – a collective attempt to solve
problems. The origin of urban myths was strongly linked to media portrayals,
and linked into classic fears about cameras and screens that were very
culturally available (even showing a screenshot from 1990’s gameshow Noel’s
House Party to demonstrate this. Urban myths are strongly socially stratified,
make use of strong arguments from analogy, corroboration and initiations to
empirically verify them. Part of this area of cultural, social engagement with
the knowledge of surveillance is managing our own labelling as paranoid –
rhetorical inoculation against later hostile accusations. Urban myths allow us
to be seen to be in the know, possessed of a counter knowledge, and resisting
authority. Listening to this
presentation, I honestly wondered how much of this we do in surveillance
studies.
Concluding Thoughts:
I can away from the LISS-COST conference with a few ideas in
my head, which probably say as much about the way I listened and interacted as
they do about the topics people wanted to talk about.
1) The state – The
conference theme was The State of Surveillance, attempting to capture both
potential meanings – the current state of surveillance, but also the role and
relation of the state in surveillance (often thought of in terms of
surveillance societies). I’d hoped for some discussion of this and found a bit.
I think it’s one of those areas that slightly complicates the interdisciplinary
interaction that typifies surveillance studies. There’s a strong sociological
tendency which, as Jerome Ferret described, often puts the state off to one
side, thinks of it as a single entity separate from society, but acting upon
it. There are research traditions which tend to focus their attention upon the
subjects of surveillance, out of a genuinely well placed concern for the impact
of surveillance upon people. I attempted
to do some of my own thinking about the state and surveillance in ‘Surveillance
and Identity’, where the state forms part of the subtitle, and is engaged with
through governmentality theory. There was a good representation at this
conference by political scientists of various types (which is often a mix in
itself) and lawyers, who tend to engage with the state in more detail, as a
result of the history and traditional focus of their respective fields. Kevin
Macnish’s work on authority (and what I see as the inevitable step backwards
towards the legitimacy of institutions) also points in a direction of one way
that surveillance studies needs to engage with the state – in the role of
various institutions that comprise the state in performing legitimate social
functions.
2) Discourses of
surveillance – another regular interest of mine, that came to mind a couple
of times during the conference, particularly in technologies as signs of
surveillance, and the role of numbers and statistics in justificatory
discourses of surveillance.
3) Institutional
Learning and knowledge formation – This came up a few times too – the
process and practices through which institutions (the state, the police, the
military and others) make sense of the world and come to believe certain things
as truth. Academia is probably implicated in this in some way, but I’m
interested in the penumbra of institutional research (it’d be ‘operational
research’ in a military context) and especially its relation to security
politics. Examples at the conference included Pete Fussy’s work on UK
counter-terrorism, and the way that several key cases studies and the ‘lessons
learned’ from these shaped future CT policy and strategy. I suspect this is
part of any coherent understanding of contemporary governmentality (ways of
seeing and making sense of the world). But I also suspect that governmental
discourses play some role in which cases are included for examination, and what
lessons are drawn from
them.
Tuesday, 22 May 2012
Spaces of Terror and Risk
The special issue of the journal Space and Culture that I guest edited with Ces Moore and Joel McKim is now out in print as volume 15, issue 2
It includes the follow articles:
It includes the follow articles:
- Introduction - Spaces of Terror and Risk - David Barnard-Wills, Cerwyn Moore & Joel McKim
- the Time/Space of Preparedness: Anticipating 'the next terrorist attack' - Claudia Aradau & Rens Van Munster
- Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror and Risk - David Barnard-Wills & Debi Ashenden
- Signifying Security - On the Institutional appeals of Nightclub ID scanning systems - Kevin Haggerty & Camile Tokar
- The Architecture of Disaster - Teresa Stoppani
- Cultivating Security: Plants in the Urban Landscape - Erin Despard
- Sexy Sammie and Red Rosie? From Burning Books to the War on Terror - John Hutnyk
Monday, 21 May 2012
Epistemology of Creep
The concept of surveillance creep is a fairly familiar one. Sometimes also known as function creep, it is the idea that surveillance systems expand to find new uses, and are introduced to more areas of life. A video surveillance system installed to prevent shoplifting, might then be used to prevent theft by staff members, and then used to measure break-times.
I'd like to talk about another sense of the word creep, and its relation to surveillance. This is the sense of creep as in creepy. Either that a person or entity is acting in a creepy, or that there is something creepy about a particular technology. This is creep as in 'a sense of creeping dread' or the feeling of something creeping up your spine - a somewhat diffuse, emotive sense that something is off.
I'm thinking about this because of Harrison Smith (@ambiveillance on Twitter), not because he's creepy, but because he brought an iphone app to my attention. 'Stalker' is an app you can use to hide your photo taking activity from casual observers. Rather than showing the image you're taking, it shows a text messaging menu, and kills any shutter sound your phone might make. An article about it used the word 'creeptastic' in the first line, and it made me think about other ways I've seen this word used. It's worth thinking about in terms of how we perceive privacy intrusions, how we communicate them with others, and how we come to agree on norms of behaviour with regard to information.
Firstly, it often occurs with the release of apps. Stalker's one example, Girls Around Me is another. Often these appear get a bit of tech media attention, get branded creepy, then get pulled from the appstore. These are often apps that leverage some of the inherent surveillance potential of small, portable, internet connected computers, that are location aware, and have cameras and microphones attached to them. Or 'phones' as we archaically insist on still calling them.Secondly, changes to the way that social networks work can come across as potentially creepy when they reveal the amount of information that a network has, leverages that information in new, often unexpected ways, or increases the amount of information it collects. The release of the newsfeed or Beacon by Facebook fell into this creepy zone in some ways.Thirdly, 'Creep' can occur with individual behaviour. This is less likely to get national or international press attention, but can be quite significant in local contexts.
Not all privacy violations are 'creepy'. There seems to be the necessity for a human agent in this mix somewhere, to act as the creepy party. Also some types of personal information seem (depending on context) to be more creepy than others.
The 'creepy' critique doesn't make any appeals to the law, rights, or privacy. Rather it seems to be making an emotional appeal to conventions and norms. Creepy behaviour is by definition outside of the norms of accepted behaviour, even if it might not be technically illegal. It is often sexually charged. We shouldn't be too surprised at this emotional register. People make sense of information flows through their contexts, and often are not using the formal legal and political theoretical frames of privacy, personal information, informational self-determination or similar. 'Creepy' is a way to describe something that feels wrong, feels off, is unexpected in a vernacular way. Being a subjective modality, its also more protected from counter-arguments - That behaviour feels creepy to me. Who are you to say it doesn't?
There seems to be something of an association with the stereotype of the socially-maladjusted computer geek in the use of 'creepy'. The suggestion that either the individuals responsible for making apps, or the company rolling out a new poorly-advised social network 'feature' have not thought through the impact of this upon human social relations, or that they might even be incapable of doing so. The image seems to be of a geek wanting to do something, not realising that it is socially censured, and building a technology to let them do it. I wonder how much this narrative personalises something that might be more systematic, or constructs as a psychology pathology something that might instead by driven by economic or institutional imperatives.The critique seems better suited to the censure of individual behaviour than to that of organisations. It also suggests that the norms for the proper use of social networks are settled. They might be more settled that we might expect for something relatively novel, but then again, there's a good argument that we might all be deciding what counts as appropriate behaviour in our own social circles.Regardless there's a strong sense of deviancy that surrounds the language of creep.
However. There's also more than a little hypocrisy to 'creepy'. One example being Facebook 'stalking' - looking at the pages of people you're not really friends with, checking out details of potential romantic partners, or attractive people. It's widely practiced, and in most of the ethnographic work on how people use social networks, many people will admit to doing it, regularly. It could even be argued to be one of the core functions and attractions of sites like Facebook. This can cross the line into creepy, but the boundaries for this happening are flexible. What might be welcome attention from one party, might be creepy stalking from another.
Precisely because of its subjectivity, the creepy critique might have limited force, but what it does benefit from is accessibility and understandability. Some deeper theoretical ways to engage with creep might be contextual integrity ('creepy' being one way of describing what it feels like when the contextual integrity of our information flows are violated in a particular type of way), another angle might be dislocation - when our models of how the world works are found lacking by exposure to some new insight or information. We believe the world to work one way, then realise that it might work another - a way that now includes some additional surveillant practice, and we find it creepy.
I'd like to talk about another sense of the word creep, and its relation to surveillance. This is the sense of creep as in creepy. Either that a person or entity is acting in a creepy, or that there is something creepy about a particular technology. This is creep as in 'a sense of creeping dread' or the feeling of something creeping up your spine - a somewhat diffuse, emotive sense that something is off.
I'm thinking about this because of Harrison Smith (@ambiveillance on Twitter), not because he's creepy, but because he brought an iphone app to my attention. 'Stalker' is an app you can use to hide your photo taking activity from casual observers. Rather than showing the image you're taking, it shows a text messaging menu, and kills any shutter sound your phone might make. An article about it used the word 'creeptastic' in the first line, and it made me think about other ways I've seen this word used. It's worth thinking about in terms of how we perceive privacy intrusions, how we communicate them with others, and how we come to agree on norms of behaviour with regard to information.
Firstly, it often occurs with the release of apps. Stalker's one example, Girls Around Me is another. Often these appear get a bit of tech media attention, get branded creepy, then get pulled from the appstore. These are often apps that leverage some of the inherent surveillance potential of small, portable, internet connected computers, that are location aware, and have cameras and microphones attached to them. Or 'phones' as we archaically insist on still calling them.Secondly, changes to the way that social networks work can come across as potentially creepy when they reveal the amount of information that a network has, leverages that information in new, often unexpected ways, or increases the amount of information it collects. The release of the newsfeed or Beacon by Facebook fell into this creepy zone in some ways.Thirdly, 'Creep' can occur with individual behaviour. This is less likely to get national or international press attention, but can be quite significant in local contexts.
Not all privacy violations are 'creepy'. There seems to be the necessity for a human agent in this mix somewhere, to act as the creepy party. Also some types of personal information seem (depending on context) to be more creepy than others.
The 'creepy' critique doesn't make any appeals to the law, rights, or privacy. Rather it seems to be making an emotional appeal to conventions and norms. Creepy behaviour is by definition outside of the norms of accepted behaviour, even if it might not be technically illegal. It is often sexually charged. We shouldn't be too surprised at this emotional register. People make sense of information flows through their contexts, and often are not using the formal legal and political theoretical frames of privacy, personal information, informational self-determination or similar. 'Creepy' is a way to describe something that feels wrong, feels off, is unexpected in a vernacular way. Being a subjective modality, its also more protected from counter-arguments - That behaviour feels creepy to me. Who are you to say it doesn't?
There seems to be something of an association with the stereotype of the socially-maladjusted computer geek in the use of 'creepy'. The suggestion that either the individuals responsible for making apps, or the company rolling out a new poorly-advised social network 'feature' have not thought through the impact of this upon human social relations, or that they might even be incapable of doing so. The image seems to be of a geek wanting to do something, not realising that it is socially censured, and building a technology to let them do it. I wonder how much this narrative personalises something that might be more systematic, or constructs as a psychology pathology something that might instead by driven by economic or institutional imperatives.The critique seems better suited to the censure of individual behaviour than to that of organisations. It also suggests that the norms for the proper use of social networks are settled. They might be more settled that we might expect for something relatively novel, but then again, there's a good argument that we might all be deciding what counts as appropriate behaviour in our own social circles.Regardless there's a strong sense of deviancy that surrounds the language of creep.
However. There's also more than a little hypocrisy to 'creepy'. One example being Facebook 'stalking' - looking at the pages of people you're not really friends with, checking out details of potential romantic partners, or attractive people. It's widely practiced, and in most of the ethnographic work on how people use social networks, many people will admit to doing it, regularly. It could even be argued to be one of the core functions and attractions of sites like Facebook. This can cross the line into creepy, but the boundaries for this happening are flexible. What might be welcome attention from one party, might be creepy stalking from another.
Precisely because of its subjectivity, the creepy critique might have limited force, but what it does benefit from is accessibility and understandability. Some deeper theoretical ways to engage with creep might be contextual integrity ('creepy' being one way of describing what it feels like when the contextual integrity of our information flows are violated in a particular type of way), another angle might be dislocation - when our models of how the world works are found lacking by exposure to some new insight or information. We believe the world to work one way, then realise that it might work another - a way that now includes some additional surveillant practice, and we find it creepy.
Thursday, 10 May 2012
how to avoid facial recognition
From Free Art and Technology
I can't academically vouch for this technique.
Wednesday, 25 April 2012
Surveillance Spottings - Toys and Nature
Spy/Security themed toys - that supposedly actually 'work' - you know, as much as the 'real' versions do |
The dullest ever model aircraft kit. Was tempted to buy it and then paint it pink. |
A dog with a webcam, from Wired Magazine. For bomd disposal work apparently. |
From the Cranfield Prospectus, research on using military radar to track endangered wildlife. |
At the SSN conference at the start of the month, Kevin Haggerty gave a talk on surveillance and nature, and stated that once you started thinking about it, examples practically threw themselves at you. So here are two I've come across recently. The dog is a platform, whilst the bird sensing radar is an example of the complex intersection between surveillance and nature. The military technology is used to understand nature, and contribute to the maintenance of a particular ecological form, but at the same time, the work can flow through to enhance the design of small stealth aircraft.
Thursday, 12 April 2012
Review: The Revolution will be Digitised, by Heather Brooke
I've just finished reading 'The Revolution will be Digitised: Dispatches from the information war' by Heather Brooke, and thought it was worth writing a few thoughts about it. I'm very sympathetic to the position adopted in the book, and its not badly written at all, I'm just not sure I learnt anything from it. I'm not sure its a book for me.
I've previously read Brooke's The Silent State, and I learnt a lot from that. Including some often uncomfortable truths about the murky, deliberately obscuring parts of the British legal and political system. It benefited from being written by an author who engaged with those issues on a daily basis, but also had an outsider's perspective on how things could be different. It was also driven by a strong moral perspective on the rights of citizens to information about the activities of government.
I have two main problems with The Revolution will be Digitised. The first is that the personal and novelised narratives are at the centre of the structure. Whilst the book does engage with issues about authority, privacy these feel secondary to the narrative of the movements and activities of a bunch of crusading journalists, hackers and wikileakers. The absence of a real system of references or bibliography particular grates for an academic reader and contributes to this. For some readers, the human perspective on the characters involved in this drama, particular the insight on the character of Julian Assange might be the key point of interest, and there's certainly a lot of that here. There's a certain amount of self promotion that goes along with this type of narrative. The second problem is related, the book's substantive content feels light, and I think this is primarily a result of the time frame of the publication. The book focuses upon events between January and November 2010, being published in August 2011. I think this account would have benefited from waiting, and seeing what else happened with WikiLeaks, the Arab Spring, Anonymous, which receive token mention. Instead, I fear it was rushed to publication because of popular interest in WikiLeaks, the impending publication of accounts by WikiLeaks insiders and Julian Assange himself.
This isn't to completely discard the book. There's a decent perspective on the global nature of privacy-invasive technologies and practices, where countries can attempt to justify their practices through reference to each other's methods, leading to a dangerous race to the bottom. The core political thesis of the book, that there is a brewing 'Information War', between those who see the Internet as an opportunity to reform politics and build something new, and others who see it as a threat to their interests or a tool of social control, certainly has some weight, and is an important topic. The subtitle is very honest, these are dispatches, personal journalistic accounts of a broader political issue. I don't want to devalue a journalist being a journalist, especially one who is trying to maintain the professional standards and style of investigative journalism. There is certainly value in that, but the substantive topics are covered in more detail elsewhere.
There's a website for the book, with additional material including some of the source interviews at www.therevolutionwillbedigitised.com
I've previously read Brooke's The Silent State, and I learnt a lot from that. Including some often uncomfortable truths about the murky, deliberately obscuring parts of the British legal and political system. It benefited from being written by an author who engaged with those issues on a daily basis, but also had an outsider's perspective on how things could be different. It was also driven by a strong moral perspective on the rights of citizens to information about the activities of government.
I have two main problems with The Revolution will be Digitised. The first is that the personal and novelised narratives are at the centre of the structure. Whilst the book does engage with issues about authority, privacy these feel secondary to the narrative of the movements and activities of a bunch of crusading journalists, hackers and wikileakers. The absence of a real system of references or bibliography particular grates for an academic reader and contributes to this. For some readers, the human perspective on the characters involved in this drama, particular the insight on the character of Julian Assange might be the key point of interest, and there's certainly a lot of that here. There's a certain amount of self promotion that goes along with this type of narrative. The second problem is related, the book's substantive content feels light, and I think this is primarily a result of the time frame of the publication. The book focuses upon events between January and November 2010, being published in August 2011. I think this account would have benefited from waiting, and seeing what else happened with WikiLeaks, the Arab Spring, Anonymous, which receive token mention. Instead, I fear it was rushed to publication because of popular interest in WikiLeaks, the impending publication of accounts by WikiLeaks insiders and Julian Assange himself.
This isn't to completely discard the book. There's a decent perspective on the global nature of privacy-invasive technologies and practices, where countries can attempt to justify their practices through reference to each other's methods, leading to a dangerous race to the bottom. The core political thesis of the book, that there is a brewing 'Information War', between those who see the Internet as an opportunity to reform politics and build something new, and others who see it as a threat to their interests or a tool of social control, certainly has some weight, and is an important topic. The subtitle is very honest, these are dispatches, personal journalistic accounts of a broader political issue. I don't want to devalue a journalist being a journalist, especially one who is trying to maintain the professional standards and style of investigative journalism. There is certainly value in that, but the substantive topics are covered in more detail elsewhere.
There's a website for the book, with additional material including some of the source interviews at www.therevolutionwillbedigitised.com
Tuesday, 10 April 2012
'Watch This Space' Surveillance Studies Network conference, Day 2
Day two of the conference saw more parallel sessions, and it looks like I spent more of the time in the 'Internet Theme'. The first panel was Lucas Melgaco (VUB), William Chivers and myself. Lucas spoke about surveillance in educational spaces, both in terms of security motivated surveillance, but also of the surveillance potential built into virtual learning aids such as moodle or blackboard. His over-riding theoretical framework was looking at surveillance in terms of rationalisation, counter-rationality and rationalism. Rationality was the focus upon predictability, calculability, efficiency and control. Rationalism was the reduction of reality to perfect rationality, with a focus upon cause and effect relations and no complexity - often with a focus on fixing one problem or deficit to the exclusion of others. I'd question about how we distinguish rationalisation from other attempts to effect change, but I'd be happy to understand rationalisation as a particular strategy or tactic of governance. Secondly, the concept of rationalism would certainly fit as a form of ideology (in the sense of a reduction of contingency). I'd suggest caution about speaking about general (global) processes of rationalisation, and rather go for specific processes in specific contexts first. Wil Chivers (Cardiff) is working on conceptualising resistance to surveillance combined with digital research methodologies. He spoke about WikiLeaks as an example of information politics, speaking truth to power, and with an awareness of surveillance (spy files, global intelligence files etc). Wil's argument was that resistance is a networked behaviour, and that whilst the individual level is important (for example in the motivation of WikiLeak's sources to leak material) networks are pivotal, and that it is networks that are amplified by the internet. Wil gave a few examples of the way that social network analysis (using software such as NodeXL) to examine links on twitter around groups such as No2ID. I think there's some potential for conducting social movement and political communication research using tools like this, and it's part of the reason that I'm interested in data visualisation. I'd also be concerned about the way that these visualisation exclude important type of information, and the idiosyncrasies of the way that we learn to read these computer generated network maps (worst case scenario, we only read what we already know, or that generating a graph is not the end of the research process). I'd assume that the best way to make use of this would be as part of multi-method triangulation research design.
I was speaking at this conference about the games design for privacy education research that the VOME project has been working on, talking about the reasons we adopted games as an alternate method of communication and way of allowing people to interact with privacy and online personal information issues, as well as the theoretical framework and the research process. More information here. There was quite a lot of interest from the audience (including some interest into translating the game into other languages and in getting hold of copies of the game to play with students). I hadn't ever thought about translation possibilities before, although I don't think it would be too hard to do. My concern would be that the game was based upon research conducted in the UK and built accordingly. I would be interested in seeing the reaction to a straight translation in other countries though, and I'd guess that some issues would resonate more strongly than others. I suspect that if one wanted to adjust the game to make it more local then it would be the event deck (where privacy events culled from the news over the last year or so crop up to mess up player plans and introduce some randomness into the game) that would need alteration. The game is Creative Commons though so I'm very happy to see what people do with it.
After the break Val Steeves and Jane Bailey gave a very engaging presentation on 'doing 'girl' online', their research into online presentation of gender. Using the publicly available facebook profiles of Canadian late teens and young women, they produced a 'composite' facebook profile for 'Tiffany'. Tiffany was a very stereotypical sociable young woman, expressing herself through socialisation, her relationship with a boyfriend, and using a familiar range of photographs, including swimwear and 'duckface' photos. Steeves and Bailey used this composite in interviews with young women in the same demographic. Their finding was that whilst young women did not want to 'be' Tiffany, they found they had to continually negotiate between their own online identity and that of the stereotype, to make space to be something different. The degree of 'openness' of the profile was part of this, with a large number of friends or an open profile, being associated with youth and then later on with the potential for slut-shaming. Participants had a sense of facebook as a commotidised space in which (at least in part) they were the commodity - pictures (including the potentially riske) were important in selling a product. In deciding what to depict, they drew upon media representations of women. Participants were also conscious of putting others under surveillance, with two forms of stalking - the 'creepy' and the normal everyday, everybody does it variety. Steeves and Bailey found serious social implications to exercising privacy and sharing controls, and that the openness that results from this is put to the back of the mind, with the social network being actively imaged as a smaller number of people. The exposure that gives status when young is costly and damaging when older, and young women considered the relationship management activity to be heavily gendered. They conjectured that more of girls' social interactions might be captured by facebook because it is a social, communicative media - they suggest that they found that boys deal with their disagreements and conflicts offline. Liisa Makinen spoke about webcam surveillance, involving themes of participation, membership, and uncritical acceptance of self-installed camera surveillance.
In the same panel, Jennifer Whitson presented her paper on the relationship between surveillance and games, particularly the concept of 'gamification' growing in the marketing and business literature. The concept behind gamification is that it takes mechanisms and models from games and applies them to other contexts to take advantage of fun and engagement that games can generate. Jen described this as the 'Mary Poppins' effect. She was rather critical of the gamification movement, which she saw as largely taking things that were tangential to games (scoreboards, points, achievement badges) and using those to quantify achievement and success within institutions, with clear parallels with workplace and educational surveillance practises. I was minded to think about the use of such games, and practises in terms of behaviour change and self or other-directed limitations. A service such as 750words which aims to help you write more is a self-chosen goal (although with some hidden underpinnings in code and architecture as well as the inevitable sell-user-data-to-others social media business model) where as being forced to play a 'game' at work, in which decisions about your employment status, remuneration etc will be evaluated through is clearly other-directed. There's obviously a step behind this, which is 'why do you want or need to write so many words, and why do you want to look like Tiffany?. I'm very sympathetic to Jennifer's perspective on gamification, which might seem a little odd given that I've been working on game design recently, but I can definitely see the difference between a game with a purpose and gamification. One of the primary differences is that the privacy game is explicitly intended to encourage discussion over the value and architecture of privacy, not to just reinforce and assess it.
Minas Samatas and Mike Zajko shared a panel on telecommunications. Minas spoke about interception scandals in capitalist democracies, suggesting that media scandals only occur when established interests are invoked or challenged (for example when a newspaper hacks into the voicemail of a politician or an actor), rather than the 'real scandal' of the whole telecommunications industry and information capitalism. He spoke about the powerful and celebrities in this context, but I think it's worth broadening that out to some account of symbolic capital in a media environment, being necessary to effect a public debate around an issue. Minas used a phrase, which I'm not sure if it's a 'theory' or not, 'Security Capitalism' which seems particularly evocative and potentially useful. That said, Minas spoke about the dual primary motives of security and profit, when these motives can occasionally be strongly in tension. Another thought that arose from this talk was due to Minas repeatedly saying 'there is no privacy'. Given various countries with a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' element to their law, that's a problematic statement for a field to go around making. I think I'd prefer the phrase 'there is surveillance' - it keeps the mechanical/technical dimension that the speaker is aiming for, and has a normative dimension, but it doesn't reject privacy as a potential legal or social mechanism for responding to that surveillance. Mike Zajko was putting together a theoretical framework around responsibilisation and governmentality, including the extension of state control through intermediaries. He identified two forms, state directed and state leveraged. The first is unfolding of the state into civil society, the other is enfolding of civil society into the formal political sphere. He's trying to capture conventional governance alongside the type of influence that media content companies have exercised over copyright reforms, where the state has been effectively captured by these industries and used to responsibilise other private actors (ISPs, youtube etc). I did wonder if states have ever really been able to govern without private actors (the example of the British East India or Hudson Bay Trading companies come to mind). I also wondered if all areas of the state were equally liable to capture by external interests (I'm guessing not, and that this would be an empirical question) or if there were different forms of capture operating in different areas. For example, defence might seem less liable to capture, but might be more vulnerable to regulatory capture by specific parties. There's likely a question a technological and knowledge asymmetry in this politics. Mike's work is reminiscent of the book I'm currently reading Imagining Security by Jennifer Wood and Clifford Shearing, which looks at nodal governance in security and policing.
In the final panel session of the day Marie Griffiths and Maria Kutar (University of Salford) spoke about their ongoing research on the day in the digital life project, and attempt to understand exposure to surveillance over a 24 hour period. It's an ambitious project, and they acknowledge the difficulty, especially in capturing those elements of the digital footprint that occur far from the subject (for example in corporate or government databases). The project seems primarily exploratory - how might we do this? is it possible? what are the biases and systematic exclusions. They're generating loads of data (in the GB/TB sense) and managing it is a problem. for me this makes the research almost agit-prop - in demonstrating the difficulties that even a geared up, dedicated research team have in understanding the extent of an individuals' data profile, they demonstrate as a fiction the idea that a normal individual, also living their own life, could understand their data profile in a systematic way, let alone 'manage' it. They're also looking at ways to visualise or illustrate the data they acquire. I asked a question about the concept of the digital identity and the focus upon the 'digitial' when various important components of one's surveillant identity (didn't use the term in the question) are paper based rather than digital (even when they have digital components). Following this, David Philips spoke about his research on the Quantified Self movement - these are people who use all manner of data sources and measuring devices in order to better understanding themselves. This therefore bought up topics of accessible, democratic surveillance infrastructures, and surveillance as a technique of knowledge production. David's theoretical position draws from surveillance, queer theory and infrastructures. His talk gave an interesting overview of the practices and tools, purposes and goals, institutionalisation of the QS movement. The various technologies are used for a range of purposes around self-reflection, sense making, goal reaching, self-knowledge, auto-ethnography, self improvement. David's take on the motivations behind this drew attention to the goal of being a healthy, energetic, productive member of an entrepreneurial economic order (see the parallel between this and gamification, and the pursuit of even seemingly self-directed goals?). There was a preponderance of a-political, really normative endeavors in a 'geeky and nice' way. Externally, David showed how even this self-directed surveillance tied into more complex external practices, for example the intense interest of the healthcare industry in the data produced by QS enthusiasts, the relationship between the service providers and data servers, including hacking the technology. QS seems to fit into a long philosophical tradition of knowing one self as a positive goal but is is very interesting how that fits in with a broader politics. I'm not sure how many of my own personal illusions I'd want shattered though!
The closing plenary of the conference was a talk by Kevin Haggerty (co-written with Dan Trottier) on Surveillance and/of Nature - monitoring beyond the human. This was interesting, and an attempt to outline the scope of an area we tend to miss in surveillance studies -the surveillance of the non-human. I can see why this is important, but I can also see why I personally tend towards surveillance of the human - it's a disciplinary and professional, political/social thing for me - that's what I'm drawn to research first. From the perspective of a broader field, its important though, and especially for theoretical completeness. The early part of the talk situated the rest, and also acknowledge the constructed and contested concept of 'nature' which reminded my of the classes on ecological politics I took with Mathew Humphrey at Nottingham. For Haggerty 'nature' is culturally important because it sits on one side of a whole load of (unstable) dichotomies (culture, science, society, technology) and its characterisation has important material consequences. Kevin drew out four areas where surveillance intersects with nature. The first of these was the area of learning, dominating and conserving, often associated with science, where visibility regimes and new ways of seeing are part of the process. Part of these processes are making nature/animals/environments more amenable to governance, but also implicated is the relationship between science and entertainment that finds its expression in the nature documentary. There are drives for knowledge for conservation, but as part of this, an extension of 'man's domination over nature' and the maintenance of animal populations etc at ideal thresholds for humans. Secondly, there are animal agents of surveillance, where the gaze of animals is instrumentalised and incorporated in different governmental agendas. Thirdly, directing and capitalising upon sensing abilities that animals have developed that humans have not, generally by training an animal to signal when it senses something, or by learning animal signals. Amber Marks has written about this sort of activity in her book 'Headspace'. The final intersection is biomimicry, the growing area (or idea) in science of drawing examples from nature. The literature here often has a environmental, progressive tone, but heavy involvement with military-industry. There are also potentials in bio-mimicry for resistance to surveillance, drawing upon camouflage and crypsis techniques. Haggerty concluded that surveillance of/and nature should be on our agenda, perhaps causing a change in our definitions of surveillance, including things that other disciplines would happily call surveillance, and push further back into the social construction of nature and technology - by looking at the ideational phases of technology developments - which I took to mean the ways that problems and concepts of what is necessary or desirable are developed.
Overall, an interesting and useful conference. I'm left thinking about surveillance in general, and the next steps for the privacy games project, but also about the politics of surveillance, in terms of self/other directed activities and structures, although this is clearly a contingent distinction that will definitely break down in many places.
I was speaking at this conference about the games design for privacy education research that the VOME project has been working on, talking about the reasons we adopted games as an alternate method of communication and way of allowing people to interact with privacy and online personal information issues, as well as the theoretical framework and the research process. More information here. There was quite a lot of interest from the audience (including some interest into translating the game into other languages and in getting hold of copies of the game to play with students). I hadn't ever thought about translation possibilities before, although I don't think it would be too hard to do. My concern would be that the game was based upon research conducted in the UK and built accordingly. I would be interested in seeing the reaction to a straight translation in other countries though, and I'd guess that some issues would resonate more strongly than others. I suspect that if one wanted to adjust the game to make it more local then it would be the event deck (where privacy events culled from the news over the last year or so crop up to mess up player plans and introduce some randomness into the game) that would need alteration. The game is Creative Commons though so I'm very happy to see what people do with it.
After the break Val Steeves and Jane Bailey gave a very engaging presentation on 'doing 'girl' online', their research into online presentation of gender. Using the publicly available facebook profiles of Canadian late teens and young women, they produced a 'composite' facebook profile for 'Tiffany'. Tiffany was a very stereotypical sociable young woman, expressing herself through socialisation, her relationship with a boyfriend, and using a familiar range of photographs, including swimwear and 'duckface' photos. Steeves and Bailey used this composite in interviews with young women in the same demographic. Their finding was that whilst young women did not want to 'be' Tiffany, they found they had to continually negotiate between their own online identity and that of the stereotype, to make space to be something different. The degree of 'openness' of the profile was part of this, with a large number of friends or an open profile, being associated with youth and then later on with the potential for slut-shaming. Participants had a sense of facebook as a commotidised space in which (at least in part) they were the commodity - pictures (including the potentially riske) were important in selling a product. In deciding what to depict, they drew upon media representations of women. Participants were also conscious of putting others under surveillance, with two forms of stalking - the 'creepy' and the normal everyday, everybody does it variety. Steeves and Bailey found serious social implications to exercising privacy and sharing controls, and that the openness that results from this is put to the back of the mind, with the social network being actively imaged as a smaller number of people. The exposure that gives status when young is costly and damaging when older, and young women considered the relationship management activity to be heavily gendered. They conjectured that more of girls' social interactions might be captured by facebook because it is a social, communicative media - they suggest that they found that boys deal with their disagreements and conflicts offline. Liisa Makinen spoke about webcam surveillance, involving themes of participation, membership, and uncritical acceptance of self-installed camera surveillance.
In the same panel, Jennifer Whitson presented her paper on the relationship between surveillance and games, particularly the concept of 'gamification' growing in the marketing and business literature. The concept behind gamification is that it takes mechanisms and models from games and applies them to other contexts to take advantage of fun and engagement that games can generate. Jen described this as the 'Mary Poppins' effect. She was rather critical of the gamification movement, which she saw as largely taking things that were tangential to games (scoreboards, points, achievement badges) and using those to quantify achievement and success within institutions, with clear parallels with workplace and educational surveillance practises. I was minded to think about the use of such games, and practises in terms of behaviour change and self or other-directed limitations. A service such as 750words which aims to help you write more is a self-chosen goal (although with some hidden underpinnings in code and architecture as well as the inevitable sell-user-data-to-others social media business model) where as being forced to play a 'game' at work, in which decisions about your employment status, remuneration etc will be evaluated through is clearly other-directed. There's obviously a step behind this, which is 'why do you want or need to write so many words, and why do you want to look like Tiffany?. I'm very sympathetic to Jennifer's perspective on gamification, which might seem a little odd given that I've been working on game design recently, but I can definitely see the difference between a game with a purpose and gamification. One of the primary differences is that the privacy game is explicitly intended to encourage discussion over the value and architecture of privacy, not to just reinforce and assess it.
Minas Samatas and Mike Zajko shared a panel on telecommunications. Minas spoke about interception scandals in capitalist democracies, suggesting that media scandals only occur when established interests are invoked or challenged (for example when a newspaper hacks into the voicemail of a politician or an actor), rather than the 'real scandal' of the whole telecommunications industry and information capitalism. He spoke about the powerful and celebrities in this context, but I think it's worth broadening that out to some account of symbolic capital in a media environment, being necessary to effect a public debate around an issue. Minas used a phrase, which I'm not sure if it's a 'theory' or not, 'Security Capitalism' which seems particularly evocative and potentially useful. That said, Minas spoke about the dual primary motives of security and profit, when these motives can occasionally be strongly in tension. Another thought that arose from this talk was due to Minas repeatedly saying 'there is no privacy'. Given various countries with a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' element to their law, that's a problematic statement for a field to go around making. I think I'd prefer the phrase 'there is surveillance' - it keeps the mechanical/technical dimension that the speaker is aiming for, and has a normative dimension, but it doesn't reject privacy as a potential legal or social mechanism for responding to that surveillance. Mike Zajko was putting together a theoretical framework around responsibilisation and governmentality, including the extension of state control through intermediaries. He identified two forms, state directed and state leveraged. The first is unfolding of the state into civil society, the other is enfolding of civil society into the formal political sphere. He's trying to capture conventional governance alongside the type of influence that media content companies have exercised over copyright reforms, where the state has been effectively captured by these industries and used to responsibilise other private actors (ISPs, youtube etc). I did wonder if states have ever really been able to govern without private actors (the example of the British East India or Hudson Bay Trading companies come to mind). I also wondered if all areas of the state were equally liable to capture by external interests (I'm guessing not, and that this would be an empirical question) or if there were different forms of capture operating in different areas. For example, defence might seem less liable to capture, but might be more vulnerable to regulatory capture by specific parties. There's likely a question a technological and knowledge asymmetry in this politics. Mike's work is reminiscent of the book I'm currently reading Imagining Security by Jennifer Wood and Clifford Shearing, which looks at nodal governance in security and policing.
In the final panel session of the day Marie Griffiths and Maria Kutar (University of Salford) spoke about their ongoing research on the day in the digital life project, and attempt to understand exposure to surveillance over a 24 hour period. It's an ambitious project, and they acknowledge the difficulty, especially in capturing those elements of the digital footprint that occur far from the subject (for example in corporate or government databases). The project seems primarily exploratory - how might we do this? is it possible? what are the biases and systematic exclusions. They're generating loads of data (in the GB/TB sense) and managing it is a problem. for me this makes the research almost agit-prop - in demonstrating the difficulties that even a geared up, dedicated research team have in understanding the extent of an individuals' data profile, they demonstrate as a fiction the idea that a normal individual, also living their own life, could understand their data profile in a systematic way, let alone 'manage' it. They're also looking at ways to visualise or illustrate the data they acquire. I asked a question about the concept of the digital identity and the focus upon the 'digitial' when various important components of one's surveillant identity (didn't use the term in the question) are paper based rather than digital (even when they have digital components). Following this, David Philips spoke about his research on the Quantified Self movement - these are people who use all manner of data sources and measuring devices in order to better understanding themselves. This therefore bought up topics of accessible, democratic surveillance infrastructures, and surveillance as a technique of knowledge production. David's theoretical position draws from surveillance, queer theory and infrastructures. His talk gave an interesting overview of the practices and tools, purposes and goals, institutionalisation of the QS movement. The various technologies are used for a range of purposes around self-reflection, sense making, goal reaching, self-knowledge, auto-ethnography, self improvement. David's take on the motivations behind this drew attention to the goal of being a healthy, energetic, productive member of an entrepreneurial economic order (see the parallel between this and gamification, and the pursuit of even seemingly self-directed goals?). There was a preponderance of a-political, really normative endeavors in a 'geeky and nice' way. Externally, David showed how even this self-directed surveillance tied into more complex external practices, for example the intense interest of the healthcare industry in the data produced by QS enthusiasts, the relationship between the service providers and data servers, including hacking the technology. QS seems to fit into a long philosophical tradition of knowing one self as a positive goal but is is very interesting how that fits in with a broader politics. I'm not sure how many of my own personal illusions I'd want shattered though!
The closing plenary of the conference was a talk by Kevin Haggerty (co-written with Dan Trottier) on Surveillance and/of Nature - monitoring beyond the human. This was interesting, and an attempt to outline the scope of an area we tend to miss in surveillance studies -the surveillance of the non-human. I can see why this is important, but I can also see why I personally tend towards surveillance of the human - it's a disciplinary and professional, political/social thing for me - that's what I'm drawn to research first. From the perspective of a broader field, its important though, and especially for theoretical completeness. The early part of the talk situated the rest, and also acknowledge the constructed and contested concept of 'nature' which reminded my of the classes on ecological politics I took with Mathew Humphrey at Nottingham. For Haggerty 'nature' is culturally important because it sits on one side of a whole load of (unstable) dichotomies (culture, science, society, technology) and its characterisation has important material consequences. Kevin drew out four areas where surveillance intersects with nature. The first of these was the area of learning, dominating and conserving, often associated with science, where visibility regimes and new ways of seeing are part of the process. Part of these processes are making nature/animals/environments more amenable to governance, but also implicated is the relationship between science and entertainment that finds its expression in the nature documentary. There are drives for knowledge for conservation, but as part of this, an extension of 'man's domination over nature' and the maintenance of animal populations etc at ideal thresholds for humans. Secondly, there are animal agents of surveillance, where the gaze of animals is instrumentalised and incorporated in different governmental agendas. Thirdly, directing and capitalising upon sensing abilities that animals have developed that humans have not, generally by training an animal to signal when it senses something, or by learning animal signals. Amber Marks has written about this sort of activity in her book 'Headspace'. The final intersection is biomimicry, the growing area (or idea) in science of drawing examples from nature. The literature here often has a environmental, progressive tone, but heavy involvement with military-industry. There are also potentials in bio-mimicry for resistance to surveillance, drawing upon camouflage and crypsis techniques. Haggerty concluded that surveillance of/and nature should be on our agenda, perhaps causing a change in our definitions of surveillance, including things that other disciplines would happily call surveillance, and push further back into the social construction of nature and technology - by looking at the ideational phases of technology developments - which I took to mean the ways that problems and concepts of what is necessary or desirable are developed.
Overall, an interesting and useful conference. I'm left thinking about surveillance in general, and the next steps for the privacy games project, but also about the politics of surveillance, in terms of self/other directed activities and structures, although this is clearly a contingent distinction that will definitely break down in many places.
Friday, 6 April 2012
'Watch This Space' Surveillance Studies Network Conference and doctoral workshop (day 1)
This week saw the 5th biannual Surveillance
Studies Network conference in Sheffield.
Before the conference, the Living in Surveillance Societies programme
was hosting a workshop for doctoral students and I’d volunteered to help out if
I could.
The doctoral school was a really good idea, and a good thing
to have before the main conference.
There were a couple of group exercise led by Niccola Green and Kirstie Ball about the formulation of research
questions (drawing upon some of the vignettes in the Report on the Surveillance
Society), accounting for the harms caused by surveillance, a discussion about access issues in
surveillance research and the round table sessions with the doctoral students
about their research projects. Apparently
the list of access issues will be circulated by Clive Norris shortly, and I’ll
hope to post that here too. Kevin
Haggerty hosted a session on writing discipline which made the argument that
part of the job of being an academic is being a professional author, and that
we should pay an appropriate amount of attention to that activity.
During the round table I got to hear about work being done
on post-Orwellian narratives in English fiction, data protection law and it’s
applicability to new types of data, street surveillance in Utrecht and
Rotterdam, government technologies of categorisation and classification, and
surveillance issues in the videogaming industry.
When I was doing my own PhD I really benefitted from
participating in both the ESRC ‘Everyday life of Surveillance’ seminar series
and also from the surveillance studies summer school at Queens University. It’s
important for PhD students to be part of a research community, not to slog
through their work in isolation, and gain experience from more established
researchers. So I’m glad to see that
sort of activity continuing. I think
there is a similar workshop associated with the LISS conference on the State of
Surveillance in Barcelona.
The conference proper opened on Tuesday morning with a talk
from Eric Metcalfe, former director of policy at Justice, who gave a very, very
thorough overview of UK law relating to the regulation of surveillance,
interception, privacy, regulation of the intelligence services and human
rights. This was against the background of the revival of communication data
retention plans under the name of the Communications Capabilties Development Plan. His talk took in a number of case
studies, the roles of the various commissioners, the interaction between Europe
and the UK legal system. His assessment of the future was that we should
anticipate four blocks of players in the politics of privacy and surveillance,
and watch their interactions. These were the coalition of celebrities and
politicians using the levenson inquiry as a tool against media intrusion and
police failings, the home office representing the interests of the police and
intelligence agencies, media organisations with a strong interest in free
expression but also under intense commercial competition, and internet
companies keep to promote free expression, but having private and commercial
interests in personal data.
As ever with this size of conference you have to make some
choices about which panels to attend, but I chose to go and listen to Dean
Wilson talk about his ongoing research into the UK border agency and local
intelligence teams, including their media depiction in reality tv. Dean was
followed by Eleanor Lockley talking about a hacking incident that disrupted an
attempt to provide the Karen refugee community in Burma with citizen journalism
and social media training. The group had a communal blog which was subverted by
an attacker, who used the information and stories posted by the participants to
write hostile personal attacks on them from compromised user accounts. The
result of this extended persecution, potentially far across geographical
borders was that most of the participants, especially those with limited
internet access pulled out of the programme.
The next session was a plenary on surveillance and the
Olympics, kicking off with Minas Samatas talking about the Greek experience,
and corruption amongst the Olympic security sector. The Olympic games were seen
as a security show case to demonstrate technological capability of private
sector security providers (even when they provide expensive system that do not
work). Phil Boyle gave a very
interesting paper about planning for the worst, risk and uncertainty. Whilst
actually impossible (there could always be something worse), the idea of
planning for the worst is invoked to demonstate that something serious is being
done about potentially catastrophic risks. This looked at a number of ‘fantasy
documents’ depicting plans, statements, goals and outlines of security
capacity, as well as the role of ‘managers of unease’, a concept borrowed from
Didier Bigo. Boyle also spoke about demonstration projects, those security
drills performed in full view of the media to almost ritually demonstrate
security and consequence management activity.
Isabella Sankey from Liberty spoke about the threat from the Olympics to
human rights and freedoms due to new legislation and the maximum use of
existing over-broad policing powers.
Another panel saw a pair of papers on social media and
policing, both formal and informal. Dan Trottier spoke about the Vancouver
hockey riots and the subsequent public attempts to present, name and shame rioters
on Facebook. This was activity not solicited by the police, and was in part an
attempt to bring criminals to the attention of the police. Dan was sceptical
about the effectiveness fo the evidential admissibility of much of this
material. He extended the metaphor of ‘little
sisters’ (as opposed to Big Brothers) by suggesting that some posters on the
vigilante groups were vindictive without reason and selective in their
accounts. Kristene Unsworth spoke about her ongoing research into the use of
social media by law enforcement, the tensions between police perception that it
would be foolish not to make use of social media information, and that citizens
probably want to be talked with, rather than talked at on social media. Lonneke
Van der Velden spoke about her analysis of alternative (non facebook) social
networks, specifically decentralised networks, asking what privacy consists of
for those platforms. The impression I got was that whilst ‘Diaspora’ had one of
those US/California ‘libertarian’ ideologies, N-1 was distinctly more
autonomist/anarchist in its politics, emphasising technological and community engagement
to get the system working.
Last thing before the conference dinner was a wine reception to celebrate the launch of the Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (link), which looks a rather impressive tome. Giving a speech about the book, Kirstie Ball identified the core themes of governance, media, resistance in relation to surveillance, which certainly resonates with me.
Friday, 30 March 2012
Invisible Robota
Saw this video today, It draws attention to the way that automation and computers (in this case 'robots') sit in for something a person might have done - a fairly neat way of representing something that isn't there.
Wednesday, 28 March 2012
Securing Virtual Space:
This week sees the online publication of a couple of articles from the special issue of Space and Culture that I co-edited with Cerwyn Moore and Joel McKim, presumably either the other articles will be published online too fairly soon, or at the same time as the print publication.
One of those is the paper I co-wrote with Debi Ashenden, 'Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror and Risk' . Quite pleased with this one and very glad to finally see it published.
One of those is the paper I co-wrote with Debi Ashenden, 'Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror and Risk' . Quite pleased with this one and very glad to finally see it published.
Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions report
The House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions was published yesterday, and I had the chance to read through it today. It's accessible here. This is an interesting report for me because I'm ambiguous about a lot of it. I'm generally working on ways of increasing privacy, but I also support freedom of expression. I think this report does what it sets out to do, but is hamstrung by its limited working brief and some core assumptions. A few observations.
This is not a general committee on privacy. It's a committee on privacy and injunctions. It is focused upon the interaction between privacy and freedom of expression - primarily in terms of publication in the press and the extent to which new forms of social media are a type of publication (a large part of the report is about the future of press regulation). 'Privacy' as I understand it, covers a much greater range of issue than are examined in this report. The problem arises if this report is read as a general, and sufficient account of privacy within the British parliamentary and legal sectors.
Privacy is still an individual value in this report, it's a possession of individuals and something that facilitates individual gains or projects. Whilst there can be a public interest in publication (that might violate privacy) the public interest in a level of social privacy is absent. More broadly, the shadow of liberal political philosophy floats over this report, looking at the balancing of Privacy 'enabling individuals to formulate ideas without public scrutiny' and freedom of expression 'essential for discovering new truths and thus enabling social progress' (p.9). It's very J.S. Mill in this respect.
It actually acknowledges the press as a power block, which sometimes speaks for vested interests and that claims for freedom of expression. However, there's no account of the monopolisation of the press, the ongoing reduction in diversity of different publishers, and the decrease in investigative journalism (except as something that might happen as a consequence of restrictions on newspaper commerciality). This is important because its these public function that legitimate the power that can be exercised through the press (and hence some of its privacy violation in the public interest).
The idea of a continuum of privacy expectations comes up again. This is the idea that some people choose to make a sort of Faustian bargain with the media, 'using' the media for their own gain. This appears to give them a reduced expectation or right to privacy. The report concludes that this doesn't remove all their interest in privacy, but is a relevant factor to be considered in legal proceedings.
The issue of access to privacy being limited by access to the legal profession (and basically cash) is an important one, and the report suggests that cost free routes for privacy protection should be built into the new press regulation arrangements. However, the report is fairly accepting of the idea that injunctions are not a particular effective or accessible tool for most people.
The part that got the media attention is where the report finds google's argument against censoring search results to prevent injuncted material coming up unconvincing. They suggest that there should be more pressure here, and float the possibility of legislation in this direction. Some of the later discussion around the way that people with an injunction keep having to deal with separate web sites and jurisdictions suggests a model of the Internet as a single entity, which is somewhat flawed.
Generally, this report presents privacy invasions as something that happens rather rapidly, at once, in a significant event and is then made public widely and loudly. As such it is not a great perspective from which to deal with slow, creeping, accumulative forms of privacy invasion such as data-mining and social sorting. This sort of activity doesn't involve the media, and it doesn't make a difference if you're a celebrity of not. There's one single mention of data protection, and no mention of ICO in here. Its again a reflection of the way that the discourse on privacy in the UK is utterly dominated by the conflicts between the media and celebrities. It's skewed away from ordinary privacy concerns and might be best understood as an inter-elite disagreement.
[otherwise, sorry for the absence of posts here recently]
This is not a general committee on privacy. It's a committee on privacy and injunctions. It is focused upon the interaction between privacy and freedom of expression - primarily in terms of publication in the press and the extent to which new forms of social media are a type of publication (a large part of the report is about the future of press regulation). 'Privacy' as I understand it, covers a much greater range of issue than are examined in this report. The problem arises if this report is read as a general, and sufficient account of privacy within the British parliamentary and legal sectors.
Privacy is still an individual value in this report, it's a possession of individuals and something that facilitates individual gains or projects. Whilst there can be a public interest in publication (that might violate privacy) the public interest in a level of social privacy is absent. More broadly, the shadow of liberal political philosophy floats over this report, looking at the balancing of Privacy 'enabling individuals to formulate ideas without public scrutiny' and freedom of expression 'essential for discovering new truths and thus enabling social progress' (p.9). It's very J.S. Mill in this respect.
It actually acknowledges the press as a power block, which sometimes speaks for vested interests and that claims for freedom of expression. However, there's no account of the monopolisation of the press, the ongoing reduction in diversity of different publishers, and the decrease in investigative journalism (except as something that might happen as a consequence of restrictions on newspaper commerciality). This is important because its these public function that legitimate the power that can be exercised through the press (and hence some of its privacy violation in the public interest).
The idea of a continuum of privacy expectations comes up again. This is the idea that some people choose to make a sort of Faustian bargain with the media, 'using' the media for their own gain. This appears to give them a reduced expectation or right to privacy. The report concludes that this doesn't remove all their interest in privacy, but is a relevant factor to be considered in legal proceedings.
The issue of access to privacy being limited by access to the legal profession (and basically cash) is an important one, and the report suggests that cost free routes for privacy protection should be built into the new press regulation arrangements. However, the report is fairly accepting of the idea that injunctions are not a particular effective or accessible tool for most people.
The part that got the media attention is where the report finds google's argument against censoring search results to prevent injuncted material coming up unconvincing. They suggest that there should be more pressure here, and float the possibility of legislation in this direction. Some of the later discussion around the way that people with an injunction keep having to deal with separate web sites and jurisdictions suggests a model of the Internet as a single entity, which is somewhat flawed.
Generally, this report presents privacy invasions as something that happens rather rapidly, at once, in a significant event and is then made public widely and loudly. As such it is not a great perspective from which to deal with slow, creeping, accumulative forms of privacy invasion such as data-mining and social sorting. This sort of activity doesn't involve the media, and it doesn't make a difference if you're a celebrity of not. There's one single mention of data protection, and no mention of ICO in here. Its again a reflection of the way that the discourse on privacy in the UK is utterly dominated by the conflicts between the media and celebrities. It's skewed away from ordinary privacy concerns and might be best understood as an inter-elite disagreement.
[otherwise, sorry for the absence of posts here recently]
Friday, 17 February 2012
Artists workshop on human interaction with privacy and identity technology
You are
invited to an afternoon of creative and narrative exercises aimed at unraveling
stories of humans interacting with technology, specifically technologies of
privacy, online identity and personal information. The aim is to trigger a
discussion with researchers and experts in a more informal and intuitive way than
traditional academic discussion. The findings of the workshop will help
designers Austin Houldsworth (http://www.austinhouldsworth.co.uk/)
and David Benqué (http://www.davidbenque.com/)
in their research towards speculative design projects as part of the
'envisioning' part of the VOME project.
The
workshop will be held on the 9th of March, from 1.30 to
5pm, at the Royal College of Art, London.
There is no
fee for participation but places are limited. Please contact d.barnardwills@cranfield.ac.uk
to confirm a place.
No artistic
ability required.
The Visualisation and Other Methods of Expression project (VOME) is a
three-year research project, funded by EPSRC, ESRC and the Technology Strategy
Board, to explore how people engage with concepts of information privacy and
consent in on-line interactions. As You can
find out more about the VOME (‘Visualisation and Other Methods of Expression’)
project at www.vome.org.uk
You can read an account of a previous event here
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